Abstract. Hannah Arendt's monumental study The Origins of Totalitarianism, published in 1951, is a founding text in postcolonial studies, locating the seeds of European fascism in the racism of imperial expansion. However, Arendt also harboured deep racial prejudices, especially when writing about people of African descent, which affected core themes in her political thought. The existing secondary literature has diagnosed but not adequately explained Arendt's failures in this regard. This article shows that Arendt's anti-black racism is rooted in her consistent refusal to analyse the colonial and imperial origins of racial conflict in the United States given the unique role of the American republic in her vision for a new post-totalitarian politics. In making this argument, the article also contributes to the vexed question of how international theorists should approach important 'canonical' thinkers whose writings have been exposed as racist, including methodological strategies for approaching such a body of work, and engages in a form of selfcritique for marginalising this problem in earlier writing on Arendt.
Sartre were not the only intellectuals to conceive European fascism as a kind of European imperialism turned inwards. In a work of breathtaking ambition, Arendt's first major book, The
Origins of Totalitarianism, showed that the seeds of fascism were not German, but international.
They were imperialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. She was the central theorist of the 'boomerang effect', the unintended consequences of imperial blowback, decades before Michel Foucault. 2 The scramble for Africa, she claimed, 'became the most fertile soil for the flowering of what later was to become the Nazi elite. Here they had seen with their own eyes how peoples could be converted into races and how… one might put one's own people into the position of the master race'. 3 Origins not only became a founding text in postcolonial studies, leading some to claim that it anticipates Fanon's Wretched of the Earth. 4 It was among the first to engage in a sustained historical and global analysis of racist ideology. Arendt placed race thinking and racism at the core of the destruction of the European system of states. 'Race thinking, rather than classthinking', she insisted, 'was the ever-present shadow accompanying the development of the comity of European nations, until it finally grew to be the powerful weapon for the destruction of those nations'. 5 In arguing that European and eventually worldwide federation was the antidote to the 'walking corpse' of the sovereign state Arendt also became a leading inspiration for theories of post-national politics. Her critique of Zionism as a potential vehicle for Jewish fascism, her prescient claim that founding a Jewish state in Palestine would repeat the suffering of the Jews, made her one of the earliest and still most influential 'post-Zionists'. what is most celebrated in her historical and theoretical work. The problem extends from her first book, in which she traded in horrific racial stereotypes about Africans, to her late public policy interventions, in which she disparaged African-Americans, all the way to her effort to theorise a new form of post-totalitarian politics, which relied on a distorted historical and political analysis of settler colonialism, slavery and racism in the United States.
Existing analyses of Arendt's racism fall into two broad camps. The first is highly critical, suggesting that these writings raise serious questions about the integrity of Arendt's work as a whole. 9 Another approach is more sympathetic and contextualist, imploring critics to keep . 24 Yet, for Arendt, there was a chasm between the concentration camps used for population control in imperial wars, in which many tens of thousands of civilians died, and the Nazi gas chambers, the central institution of totalitarianism. It was not a question of numbers, or even their European victims, but the anti-utilitarian character of the extermination camps fundamentally set them apart. Unlike all previous forms of domination, including chattel slavery, 'the gas chambers did not benefit anybody'. 25 Totalitarianism was a rupture in human history.
Whether or not one agrees with DuBois, it is certain that Arendt's response to totalitarianism led her to produce one of the most original and significant bodies of twentiethcentury political thought. Unfortunately, the particular way she sought to establish totalitarianism's novelty relied on a series of evocative but deeply problematic historical distinctions. The most important for our purpose is that between race thinking and racism and settler colonialism and the 'new imperialism' of the late-nineteenth-century. pursuit of power. Similarly, Arendt argued that the 'race thinking' of the eighteenth-century used to justify civilisational hierarchies and discrimination was different from the more virulent ideology of racism, which she again claimed was a product of the nineteenth-century. Race thinking had permitted some form of co-existence between groups. Indeed, Arendt argued that earlier colonial settlers were never 'seriously concerned with discrimination against other peoples as lower races'. 27 In contrast, racism was an explicit ideological system to justify the radicalisation of imperial expansion. Racial hierarchy became the 'new key to history', a universal law to validate equally novel forms of global domination. 28 Just as Arendt insisted that anti-Semitism was not the modern manifestation of some timeless hatred of the Jews, she claimed that there was no 'immanent logic' to racism; 'even slavery', she insisted, 'though actually established on a strict racial basis, did not make the slave-holding peoples race-conscious before the nineteenth-century'. 29 Anti-Semitism, racism, and the new imperialism were historical phenomenon that crystalised to become the unprecedented phenomenon of twentieth-century totalitarianism.
If, as Arendt claimed, totalitarianism was a fundamental break, then conventional historical narrative based on the causal sequence of long-term developmental processes was inadequate. Arendt was especially scathing of all forms of process-thinking and developmental histories, taking Hegel's Philosophy of History as exemplary. 30 There is some irony then for while Arendt rejected developmental philosophies of history she was unable to move beyond Hegel's associated hierarchy of civilisations. Specifically, she adopted the distinction, also prevalent in German anthropology, between Kulturvölker and Naturvölker, cultured and natural peoples, those with history and those without. 31 In doing so, Arendt perpetuated some of the 27 Consider chapter seven of Imperialism, 'Race and Bureaucracy', which contains the section, 'The Phantom World of the Dark Continent'. 34 Arendt's purpose here is to understand the mindset of those who massacre entire populations without believing they had done anything wrong. The conscious aims of the Nazis most direct European forerunners, the Pan-German and Pan-Slav movements, were first laid bare in Africa. They 'can be watched like a laboratory test in the Boers' early and sad attempt' to transform a 'people into a horde'. 35 These Dutch settlers thought they were a chosen people. To Arendt, they were 'the only European group that ever, though in complete isolation, had to live in a world of black savages'. 36 Their racism, Arendt claimed, was 'the emergency explanation of human beings whom no European or civilized man could understand and whose humanity so frightened and humiliated the immigrants that they no longer cared to belong to the same human species'. 37 In a kind of nineteenth-century environmental and demographic determinism, Arendt depicted the Boers -and her own -sense of the 'overwhelming monstrosity of Africa', the 'merciless sun' and 'entirely hostile nature', the all the color of their skin but… that they treated nature like their undisputed master, that they had not created a human world, a human reality'. 45 Arendt's principle agenda was not to denigrate 'tribal' Africans as such, but to show that because they 'were, as it were, "natural" human beings who lacked the specifically human character, the specifically human reality, …when European men massacred them they somehow were not aware that they had committed murder'. 46 Arendt was trying to suggest that any mutual recognition of rights depends on human artifice; that there was no such thing as 'natural' rights. But she could only do so on a racist premise. We know Hence some people are more or less 'cultured', more or less free, and thus more or less fully human. It was Arendt's personal experience of and writing on statelessness that led her to claim that political freedom was wholly dependent on the ability to forge a public realm grounded on the appropriate distinction between nature and political artifice, between human life and the political world; the 'abstract nakedness of being nothing but human' was politically irrelevant, even dangerous. Similarly, when racism triumphed, she claimed, all 'deeds are… explained as "necessary" consequences of some "Negro" qualities; he has become some specimen of an animal species, called man'. 49 There was no in-born human dignity to protect this 'animal species' separate from the concrete laws and institutions that upheld political rights. Human status was a function of politics. The problem is that Arendt made this argument through maligning cultures 46 They treated the natives as raw material and lived on them as one might live on the fruits of wild trees… to vegetate on essentially the same level as the black tribes had vegetated for thousands of years… When the Boers, in their fright and misery, decided to use these savages as though they were just another form of animal life, they embarked upon a process which could only end with their own degradation into a white race living beside and together with black races from whom in the end they would differ only in the color of their skin.
51
The Boers had betrayed the putatively human need, exemplified by cultured Europeans, to transform nature into culture, the earth into a world, and were thus 'the first European group to become completely alienated from the pride which Western man felt in living in a world created and fabricated by himself'. 52 Arendt did not consider the possibility that those Africans of whom she wrote, but about which she knew almost nothing, possessed their own form of political activity and world making that was not 'a world of folly', that they did not live 'on an unprepared and unchanged nature' 53 or 'without the future of a purpose and the past of an accomplishment'. for saviors from another world; they would also call for Tito if only Yugoslavia were farther away and less approachable'. 83 Things become more sinister when she turns to the movement for Black Power; 'its ideological commitment to the nonexistent "Unity of the Third World" is not sheer romantic nonsense. They have an obvious interest in a black-white dichotomy; this too is of course mere escapism -an escape into a dream world in which Negros would constitute an overwhelming majority of the world's population'. 84 Rather than seek to understand why antiracist activists might situate themselves within wider anticolonial and -neocolonial struggles, that is, in the context of global white supremacy, Arendt reduced black solidarity to a crass demographic calculation. 85 She presented black students as more violent than whites, with the backing of the wider 'black community'. 'Serious violence', she claimed, 'entered the scene only with the appearance of the Black Power movement on American campuses. Negro students, the majority of them admitted without academic qualification, regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of the black community'. 86 These black students then made 'nonsensical and obviously damaging demands' such as instruction in the 'nonexistent subjects' of African literature, 'soul courses', and Swahili, 'a nineteenth-century kind of no-language'. 87 The 'white rebels', in contrast, put forth 'disinterested and usually highly moral claims', such as support for 'nonviolent "participatory democracy"'. 88 How and why is Hannah Arendt in the position of denying the reality of the Third World, of dismissing black student demands, and claiming that Swahili is a 'no-language'? What is at stake, for Arendt, in claiming that African literature is a 'non-existent subject'? My argument is that 'On Violence' should be read, in part, as Arendt's futile effort to deny that her own boomerang thesis applied in the New World to maintain an idealised version of the American republic, a form of American exceptionalism. At stake in Arendt's attack on Fanon and Sartre, Black Power, African literature, and black students is more than a defense of a particular theory of violence and Eurocentric curriculum. Arendt believed that there was inevitability to the violence of interracial struggle. Echoing her account of the Boers massacres of tribal Africans, she wrote, 'Racism, white or black, is fraught with violence by definition because it objects to natural organic facts -a white or black skin -which no persuasion or power could change; all one can do, when the chips are down, is to exterminate their bearers… Violence in interracial struggle is always murderous, but it is not "irrational"; it is the logical and rational consequence of racism'. 89 Arendt is surely right that racism is inevitably violent. 100 Arendt's dismissal of black students and praise for whites was not because she was a leading proponent of non-violent civil disobedience, as if African-Americans were not pioneers of such activity. Rather she was deeply troubled by a notion of a continuum between colonial violence abroad and colonial violence 'at home', when this 'home' was her own and so much of her post-totalitarian political theory was invested in its civic republican form of government. 101 Arendt's denial of American imperialism and disavowal of the Third World was of a par with her lack of understanding of structural racism in the American republic and ideological racism in the transatlantic slave trade, which she had already failed to adequately address in both
Origins and On Revolution. To support her distinction between race thinking and racism as an ideology Arendt had downplayed the ideological racism of slavery, which in the American context was present much earlier than the nineteenth-century, as well as the racial dimensions of earlier settler colonialisms. 102 Arendt was clear that slavery was the 'primordial crime upon which the fabric of American society rested'. 103 She acknowledged that 'the extermination of native peoples went hand in hand with the colonization of the Americas, Australia and Africa'. 104 But
Arendt insisted that the 'Negro question' could only be 'addressed within the political and historical framework' of the republic. But the claim rested on a distorted historical and political analysis of race and violence in America, an effective disavowal of deep transnational structures of white supremacy that must be addressed within a political and historical framework beyond her beloved American republic.
Conclusion
This article has shown that Hannah Arendt's political analysis of race in America foundered, in no small measure, on her effort to deny its irreducibly colonial and imperial context. security. 118 The problem with such a distinction may go beyond Arendt's denigration of those she deemed unworldly; it might be racist and colonial to the core. 119 In writing on Anglo-American counterinsurgency, I emphasised European imperialism to the neglect of settler colonialism and its racisms, which is far more significant for understanding the relationship between war-making and state-making in the United States.
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Hannah Arendt, like many in IR, was unable to fully escape the discourse of European superiority in which she was trained and acculturated. Hence we should be wary of condemning the woman herself. There is no 'interpretative "high road"' from which to read Arendt. 121 But her thought, and our own, must also be held to account in the effort to decolonise the theory canon for IR. It would be easy to write her work off, for much of what she wrote was unclear, contradictory, and even worse, it was misogynistic, racist, Orientalist, elitist, and unnecessarily antagonistic toward Marx. But there are no un-problematic thinkers. Franz Fanon held deeply sexist and homophobic views, yet he remains indispensible to critical studies of race and hence non-racist international theory. 122 Arendt held deeply problematic views about people of African descent that go to the core of, and even call into question, much that has been valued and celebrated in her work. The question is how many of her signature contributions to political thought rest on racist and ethnocentric premises, and whether anything is left of the work if these premises can be severed and fully reworked. 123 There is no easy way to find out except through such a reworking and there is no one-size-fits-all checklist that can be applied across canonical thinkers. But to refuse the work may be to miss what Arendt got right, to miss certain things that nobody else but
